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Abstract
Ransomware is an emerging threat which imposed a $ 5 bil-
lion loss in 2017 and is predicted to hit 11.5 billion in 2019.
While initially targeting PC (client) platforms, ransomware
recently made the leap to server-side databases – starting
in January 2017 with the MongoDB Apocalypse attack, fol-
lowed by other attack waves targeting a wide range of DB
types such as MongoDB, MySQL, ElasticSearch, Cassandra,
Hadoop, and CouchDB. While previous research has devel-
oped countermeasures against client-side ransomware (e.g.,
CryptoDrop and ShieldFS), the problem of server-side ran-
somware has received zero attention so far.
In our work, we aim to bridge this gap and present
DIMAQS (Dynamic Identification of Malicious Query Se-
quences), a novel anti-ransomware solution for databases.
DIMAQS performs runtime monitoring of incoming queries
and pattern matching using Colored Petri Nets (CPNs) for
attack detection. Our system design exhibits several novel
techniques to enable efficient detection ofmalicious query se-
quences globally (i.e., without limiting detection to distinct
user connections). Our proof-of-concept implementation tar-
gets MySQL servers. The evaluation shows high efficiency
with no false positives and no false negatives and very mod-
erate performance overhead of under 5%. We will publish
our data sets and implementation allowing the community to
reproduce our tests and compare to our results.
1 Introduction
In today’s era of digital transformation, data has become
more critical than ever before. The amount of data we pro-
duce daily is astonishing – every day hundreds of millions
of people are taking photos, make videos and exchange mes-
sages. Furthermore, data is not only an asset for users nowa-
days, but has also become the key component of digitization
and transformation of today’s businesses globally – enter-
prises collect data on consumer preferences, purchases, and
trends and use it to optimize their business models and strate-
gies. Given such trends, the importance of database security
is hard to overestimate – the rapid growth of the data volume
stored in the databases of service providers, in cloud environ-
ments and enterprise data centers, as well as their increasing
importance, make them attractive attack targets.
Traditionally, attacks on data have aimed to undermine
confidentiality and authenticity. More recently, however, at-
tacks against the availability of data, services, and users have
become common as well – modern attackers deploy ransom-
ware, malicious software that encrypts data and holds the de-
cryption key until the victim pays a ransom. They still claim
the ransom pretending to have encrypted the data. The finan-
cial loss from ransomware is significant – it reached 5 billion
USD in 2017 and is predicted to hit 11.5 billion by 2019 [50].
The rise of server-side ransomwareWhile the first ransom-
ware attacks targeted client platforms (information stored in
users’ files), recently such attacks made a leap to server-
side databases that store, accumulate and process (big)
data. In January 2017 tens of thousands of MongoDB
servers were hit in an attack calledMongoDBApocalypse [9,
10], followed by a second attack wave targeting MySQL
servers [60]. Since then, server-side ransomware attacks
spread to a wide range of server technologies, including Elas-
ticSearch [11], Cassandra [7], Hadoop and CouchDB [8].
Attack scenario The typical attack scenario of server-side
ransomware observed so far is as follows: First, an attacker
gains remote privileged access to the database database
through the exploitation of configuration vulnerabilities such
as the usage of default passwords 1. Once connected, they ex-
ecute commands for data enumeration (e.g., to learn names
of databases and tables hosted), then drop (delete) data and
insert the ransom message with instructions how to pay the
ransom. Remarkably, in contrast to client-side ransomware,
the new attack form wipes the data without making any plain-
text or encrypted copy, e.g., acting as a wiper. This strategy
has, on the one hand, more dramatic implications for the vic-
1Note that default passwords and other misconfiguration errors are preva-
lent real-world problems. For instance, Mirai botnet [1] used similar vulner-
abilities to take over more than 600,000 IoT devices arond the globe.
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tim, since the data is unrecoverable even if the ransom is
paid. On the other hand, the attack is stealthier, since no
intensive and easily detectable operations required, such as
bulk encryption or massive data copying, and no back chan-
nel to the attacker needed (e.g., for delivering the decryption
key or recovered data) that could be used to trace them back.
Motivation for server-side ransomware to spread While
server-side ransomware is more recent and to this day less
widespread than client-side ransomware, there are reasons
why the situation might change quite soon. First, enter-
prises can afford to pay higher ransoms than private users.
As a comparison, the typical ransom amount for regular
users lies in the range of a few hundred dollars. However,
businesses can pay much more – for instance, in a recent
attack, a Los Angeles Hospital paid USD 17000 of ran-
som to attackers [49]. Second, in recent years, researchers
and antivirus companies developed countermeasures against
client-side ransomware. However, to date, no solutions exist
against ransomware targeting database servers. This lack of
protection makes databases easy attack targets.
Do victims pay the ransom to a wiper? Note that there is
evidence that even though server-side ransomware is a wiper,
some desperate victims paid the ransom, nonetheless. We
identified that two known ransomware addresses involved
in MySQL attacks [60] received 0.6 BTC (equivalent to 3
payments). For the attacks against MongoDB, we identified
a total of 160 ransom payments to the addresses collected
in [9], totaling in 26.35 BTC. Moreover, the survey [9] re-
veals that even production systems lack sufficient protection
by strong passwords and sensible backup strategy: Among
123 surveyed ransom victims, only 11% had recent backups,
and 8% paid the ransom.
State of the art Existing anti-ransomware solutions are aim-
ing at detection of client-side ransomware only. They follow
two dominant strategies: Signature-based detection of mali-
cious binaries and runtime monitoring and behavioral analy-
sis for anomaly detection. The first one builds upon detec-
tion of malicious binaries and is typically used by anti-virus
vendors, while the second strategy originates from research
papers [12, 13, 37, 54] and relies on runtime monitoring of
file accesses and the detection of malicious activity based
on heuristics, such as access to multiple files, their modifi-
cation, and renaming. Unfortunately, both strategies are not
applicable for detection of database wipers. Since in server-
side ransomware attack scenario an attacker connects to the
database remotely, there is no malicious binary on the plat-
form that could be detected. Furthermore, monitoring at the
file system level for abnormal activity is not adequate either
since there is no direct correlation between an attacker’s ac-
tivity and file access patterns.
Our contributions In this paper, we aim to improve the se-
curity of database systems and propose DIMAQS (Dynamic
Identification of Malicious Query Sequences), signature-
based intrusion detection tool that can detect sequences of
malicious queries. Generally, the tool is not limited to ran-
somware detection and can potentially be applied to detec-
tion of other attack classes as long as they rely on malicious
sequences of queries (e.g., advanced SQL injections aiming
at removing code execution [15]). However, motivated by
the rise of server-side ransomware we apply it to the problem
of ransomware detection. We make the following contribu-
tions:
• We provide design and implementation of DIMAQS, a
framework that can detect sequences of malicious queries.
To keep track of queries and to perform detection, our solu-
tion leverages Colored Petri Nets (CPNs) to model the se-
ries of events used in attacks and to match them to known
malicious patterns. Our system design exhibits several
novel techniques (dynamic creation of colors, merging of
tokens and token expiration) to reduce the complexity of
the system representation and achieve better performance.
Our framework performs system-wide monitoring and as
such can detect malicious sequences injected through sev-
eral user sessions and interleaved with benign queries – a
quite interesting feature that eliminates most obvious eva-
sion strategies. Our implementation targets MySQL, one
of the most popular database management systems, and im-
poses only a very moderate performance overhead under
5%. We realize our solution in the form of a MySQL plu-
gin that is easily installable on existing MySQL servers,
thus preserving compatibility with legacy software. We
will publish the source code on GitHub along with the pa-
per.
• We apply DIMAQS to the challenging problem of server-
side ransomware. To make detection of such attacks pos-
sible, we analyze previously observed attacks and extract
their distinctive properties that provide a basis for attack
detection. We then evaluate the effectiveness and practical-
ity of our solution using three data sets: Malicious data set
recorded by us, and benign query sets from a publication
management system and a MediaWiki server. The results
demonstrate the high efficiency of our approach with no
false negatives or false positives. We will publish our data
sets along with the paper to the benefit of the research com-
munity. To the best of our knowledge, our malicious data
set will be the first one publicly available.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we present the necessary background followed
by system design of DIMAQS in Section 3. In Section 4, we
reveal the details of our prototype implementation. Prototype
evaluation results are presented in Section 5. After a review
of the related work in Section 6, we conclude the paper and
outline future work in Section 7.
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Figure 1: Demonstration of Petri net execution using a simple example
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Figure 2: Colored Petri Net example. In comparison to the regular Petri net depicted in Figure 1, the number of required places
is reduced from two to one without reducing functionality.
2 Background
In this section, we provide the necessary background on Petri
nets and their enhanced version, colored Petri nets.
Petri Nets are a commonly used mathematical modeling lan-
guage for the description of distributed systems [51] named
after their inventor Carl Adam Petri. They are a class of dis-
crete event dynamic systems. A Petri net is a directed bipar-
tite graph, in which nodes represent places and transitions,
while edges, called arcs, connect either a place to a transi-
tion or a transition to a place, but never connect two places
or two transitions directly. Transitions are events in the sys-
tem, and places are conditions that need to be satisfied for
the transition to fire.
Places may contain a discrete number of marks called to-
kens. Transitions fire if they are enabled, which is achiev-
able by placing enough input tokens on the input places –
i.e., places directly connected to the transition. The value
of the arc defines the number of tokens required per place.
Once a transition fires, it consumes the required number of
input tokens from the input places. The transition results in
creating the specified number of output tokens on the places
with arcs from the transition to them (output places).
Figure 1 shows a simple example of a Petri net. The de-
picted Petri net consists of three places (depicted as circles),
one transition (depicted as a bar), and three arcs. Enabling
the transition requires three tokens: Two tokens at place p1
and one token at place p2. In Figure 1a only one token is
available at p1. Regardless of the total count being three to-
kens, with only one token on p1, the transition is not yet
enabled. Adding another token to p1 in Figure 1b satisfies
the requirement and thus enables the transition. When the
transition fires, two tokens are subtracted from the token set
at p1 as well as one token from p2. At the same time, the
transition adds one token to p3. Figure 1c shows the state
after the transition firing.
Petri nets are a powerful tool for modeling [5] and allow
for extensions to suit various tasks like queuing Petri nets for
performance modeling. In this work, we use colored Petri
nets, an extension to ordinary Petri nets.
Colored Petri Nets (CPNs) enable support for tokens of dif-
ferent types, also known as token colors. Places can now con-
tain tokens of multiple colors. Arcs can define any combina-
tion of the colors for the number of input and output tokens.
This addition allows for making Petri nets more compact.
Figure 2 illustrates the reduction in representation com-
plexity by presenting a CPN derived from the previous ex-
ample. The places p1 and p2 depicted in Figure 1 are now
merged into a single place denoted as p1, while tokens are
now assigned different colors: Tokens formerly placed in p1
are now black (1) and those placed in p2 are red (2). The
transition now requires two black and one red token instead
of requiring two tokens from p1 and one from p2. The over-
all Figure 2 depicts the same process as before. In Figure 2a,
one black token is missing for the transition to be enabled.
In Figure 2b this token is added, thus enabling the transition.
Finally, in Figure 2c the transition has fired, subtracting two
black and one red token from p1 and adding a black token to
p3.
3 Design
DIMAQS is the first system that aims at the detection of ran-
somware attacks in databases. In a nutshell, it represents an
intrusion detection system that leverages knowledge about
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the attack pattern (or signature) and performs real-time sys-
tem monitoring and pattern matching to detect intrusion at-
tempts. For pattern matching, we leverage a CPN to encode
the system states and their transitions inside the color infor-
mation to detect when the system transitions to the state as-
sociated with the attack description.
The usage of (colored) Petri nets is a known technique
for pattern matching, and their application to intrusion detec-
tion problems was investigated in previous works [26, 40].
However, typical application scenarios of CPN-based intru-
sion detection systems target other environments, e.g., net-
works [59] and operating systems [2].
The application of Petri nets for intrusion detection in
databases was only considered by Hu et al. [26], who aimed
at detection of anomalies of any sort, not specific to ransom-
ware. However, they use uncolored Petri nets and leverage
them to model benign states of a database system rather than
attack states. Hence, their solution requires a training phase
to gain knowledge about the underlying data structure as well
as about benign data update patterns. In contrast, our system
does not require similar training. Moreover, their work is the-
oretical. Hence, they did not provide any implementation or
evaluation results with which to compare.
In our work, we aim to fill the gap and address the prob-
lem of ransomware attacks targeting databases. As such, we
investigate the applicability of CPNs for ransomware attack
detection in databases. We observe that databases are com-
plex systems and modeling their state regarding dependency
relationships and update patterns, as, e.g., done in [26], may
lead to overly complicated system representations (for large
and complex databases) and non-trivial overhead. Hence, we
tackle the problem differently and choose to modelmalicious
query sequences – an approach which results in a much sim-
pler system representation, and independence from the struc-
ture of the underlying data and update patterns.
Our approach is system-centric and allows for detection of
attacks that are carried out over multiple sessions or multiple
user accounts. We also develop several novel techniques that
even further to simplify the system representation, namely
(1) dynamic color creation (creating an infinite color space),
(2) token merging and duplication, and (3) token expiration
making the use of CPNs practical.
The remaining part of this section is structured as follows:
We first describe a typical ransomware attack scenario (Sec-
tion 3.1). Next, we present our adversarymodel (Section 3.2)
followed by the system architecture description (Section 3.3).
Finally, we show the interaction of the system components
when handling incoming queries (Section 3.4).
3.1 Attack Scenario
Our attack scenario originates from an analysis of a large-
scale ransomware attack targeting MySQL servers that took
place in February 2017 [60]. The attacker performs the at-
tack remotely by connecting to the database using a TCP
connection. Once connected, an attacker gains root ac-
cess through, e.g., brute-forcing the ‘root’ password of the
database. Next, they enumerate the data in the database
through retrieval of the list of the databases present. After
that, the attacker creates a new table with an arbitrary name
(e.g., the table with the name ‘WARNING’), either in a new
database (e.g., named ‘PLEASE_READ’) or in an already
existing database. This table includes a ransom message con-
taining a contact email address as well as payment instruc-
tions to a bitcoin address. Finally, the attacker deletes (drops)
the databases on the server and disconnects.
The scenario above describes the attack steps recorded
in real-world attacks. Additionally, we accept that attack
steps can deviate from this scenario: For instance, an at-
tacker could first perform the database deletion and only af-
ter that insert the ransom message. Also, attackers may use
arbitrary names for databases and tables and arbitrary pat-
terns for the ransom message. We, however, assume that
the attacker demands payments in cryptocurrency (such as
Bitcoin or Ethereum) since they provide at least some level
of anonymity in contrast to more traditional payment meth-
ods that involve banks2. We also assume that an attacker
continues to wipe data and does not aim to keep any data
copies, since this would slow down the attack significantly,
and would require storage on attacker’s side and a commu-
nication channel between the victim and the attacker, which
demands additional resources and increases chances of expo-
sure. We also assume an attacker does not perform on-site
database encryption since we did not identify any standard
SQL commands that could be used to do so.
3.2 Adversary Model
We make the following assumptions about the goal and the
capabilities of the attacker. The attacker’s goal is to destroy
the available data and claim the ransom. We assume the re-
mote attacker who is accessing the server over the Internet
has no physical access to it. The software running on the
server is trusted, i.e., the attacker has no malicious software
installed on the system. However, the attacker has full ac-
cess to the network and can communicate with the DBMS
without any restrictions. Furthermore, we assume an attacker
with administrator-level privileges to the DBMS. This as-
sumption is often fulfilled in practice since the problem of
weak or re-used passwords [33] is well known and not satis-
factory solved for over decades. For instance, findings show
that most of the MySQL servers had no root password set due
to using an insecure default configuration [14]. Alternatively,
an attacker might exploit a security vulnerability like [19] to
gain administrator privileges for the database.
We, however, do not assume administrator privileges of
the attacker to the operating system. Also, we leave DoS
2Since banks are obliged to follow "know your customer" policy.
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Figure 3: System architecture of DIMAQS. Dark grey boxes
are components provided by the database, light grey boxes
are components that interface between DIMAQS and the
database, and white boxes belong to DIMAQS itself.
attacks are out of our attacker model since an attacker with
administrator privileges to DBMS can always cause a denial
of service, e.g., through the creation of fake DBs or tables
and exhausting DB’s memory. The attacker wants to perform
a hit-and-run attack without considering other services and
ways of communication.
3.3 System Architecture
Figure 3 shows the DIMAQS system architecture. DI-
MAQS is comprised of six components: (i) Monitoring,
(ii) Classifier, (iii) Security Policy, (iv) Incident
Resolution, (v) Notifier, (vi) Query Rewriter and
(vii) Controller. The Monitoring and Query Rewriter
components use the query parser embedded in the database
server. Hence, the figure shows them as belonging to both,
DIMAQS plugin and the database server. In the following,
we describe the role of every component in more detail.
Monitoring The Monitoring component monitors all in-
coming queries for potentially malicious query sequences.
Note that this module monitors all queries arriving through
different connections, not specific to user sessions. Notifica-
tions on the occurrence of incoming queries result from the
database server’s audit functionality.
Classifier The Classifier component processes the incom-
ing queries and produces a verdict whether a query is benign
or malicious. For the classification, DIMAQS uses a CPN
with our extensions. The token colors are used to attach run-
time information to the tokens, such as time-stamps, table
names and modified cell values. Since such token colors are
dynamic and unbounded, conventional Petri nets would be
unable to represent all the possible states. This information
also provides additional information to the DIMAQS admin-
istrator in the case of an incident3.
Extensions to CPNs. For our purposes, we extend CPNs
with three new features. The first is the dynamic creation
of colors for storing information inside the tokens. The sec-
ond is the ability to merge tokens that are identical except
for their timestamps. This extension improves performance
and does not impede classification accuracy. The third ex-
tension allows for token expiration. Since each place in the
CPN can have timeout information, this feature can be used
to limit the time window of analyzed query sequences. It is
highly unlikely that a malicious query sequence spawns over
a long period (e.g., days), since this increases the risk of de-
tection and complicates the attack (the database can change
considerably over time). Large or absent timeouts can addi-
tionally result in a higher false positive rate since eventually
all transitions might be triggered by unrelated queries. The
timeout threshold is, therefore, a security parameter, which
enables a trade-off between effectiveness and false alerts. In
real-world attacks observed so far, attackers did not stretch
malicious query sequences over long periods. Hence, even
short timeouts (1-2 minutes) would work well against them.
Attackers might increase the attack time window to avoid de-
tection. However, the longer they stay connected, the higher
the burden for them (since the attacks are not generally au-
tomated), and the higher the risk of being uncovered, espe-
cially given the fact that they do not know the currently used
threshold parameter and, hence, have no understanding for
how long they should stay connected to remain undetected.
Security Policy The Security Policy component holds in-
formation about patterns of malicious query sequences (or at-
tack signatures). The CPN configuration represents it in our
system – it describes CPN’s places, place actions, transitions,
transition actions, transition conditions, and arcs.
All places and transitions are named, and the arcs are each
weighted with a value of 1 token. Each place can be assigned
several place actions executed upon CPN transitions to the
corresponding place. Transitions are used to check for the ex-
ecution of a (next) step in a malicious query sequence. They
become active when the source place contains at least one
token. Each transition is assigned one transition action, rep-
resenting conditions for incoming queries. For instance, they
may specify the query type (e.g., query that lists tables) and
the actual content of the query (such as a table name or a
typical ransom message).
A transition may also have an arbitrary number of tran-
sition conditions which are used to evaluate the token data
from the source place against the query values. Our policy
includes only one transition condition, ensuring ransommes-
3Note that DIMAQS administrator and database administrator are differ-
ent entities
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Always
Figure 4: The CPN used to classify database transactions.
All arcs are weighted with a value of 1 token.
States: Initialx: initial states; Listx: objects listed, TabCreated :
table created; Ob jDel : object (database or table) deleted;
MSGInserted : ransom message inserted; Noti f yAdmin: noti-
fication sent
Transitions: ListDB: list databases; ListTab: list tables; ListCol
list columns;CreateTable: create table;DropTable: drop table;
Modi f yTable: modify table; InsertMsg: insert ransom mes-
sage
Place Description
DBListed Rewriting
TabListed Rewriting
ColListed Rewriting
TabCreated Trigger creation
Ob jDel Create backup
Noti f yAdmin Create notification
Table 1: Configured actions for the places inside the CPN in
Figure 4. When a token reaches a place, the specified action
can be executed.
sage insertion into a previously created or modified table.
We depict the CPN that was tailored to the observed at-
tacks configured according to our security policy in Figure 4.
Table 1 shows the place actions executed after putting a token
on the place.
Transitions fire when an action occurs that is specified as
malicious by the Security Policy component. Note, that
no single action alone is enough to transit the CPN to the
"attack detected" state. Typically, the sequence of actions
would be required, and their execution requires a specific or-
der (defined by the CPN configuration) to reach the state that
corresponds to attack detection.
The policy is easily adaptable to include new attack sig-
natures by modifying the Petri net. While reconfiguration is
a manual process, it is not cumbersome and can be accom-
plished in a reasonable amount of time4.
4Our estimate is 30 min.
Incident ResolutionWhen an event in the Classifier com-
ponent issues an action, an action must be carried out by the
Incident Resolution module. Possible actions are “cre-
ate backup,” “rewriting” and “create notification.” Incident
Resolution performs the rewriting of malicious queries as
well as creates backups.
Create backup action. Whenever the system detects a po-
tential attack, the Incident Resolution component will
move the database, or the table dropped by an attacker to
a safe place instead of deleting it. The backup copy is invisi-
ble to users (and, hence, from the attacker) so that an attacker
cannot drop it again or even identify that such a backup ex-
ists. To hide backed up tables and databases from users,
Incident Resolution uses a "rewriting" action. While
performing such a move, Incident Resolution renames
the protected tables to avoid name collisions.
Rewriting Action. Rewriting actions rewrite queries to ex-
clude tables and databases created by DIMAQS. The Query
Rewriter component performs these actions.
Notification action. Notification actions are used by the
Incident Resolution componentwhenever there is a need
to notify an administrator about a detected attack. The
Notifier component performs this notification as described
below.
Notifier The Notifier component informs about security
incidents by sending an email to the DIMAQS administrator.
The gathered information relevant to the incident is attached
to the notification so that the administrator can evaluate the
incident and respond accordingly (e.g., restore the deleted
table).
Query Rewriter The Query Rewriter component rewrites
queries to exclude tables and databases created by DIMAQS
from query results. For a ‘rewriting’ action, the Query
Rewriter receives the name of the table and, if applicable,
the name of the database from the Incident Resolution
component. If the queries are nested, the Query Rewriter
extracts them into sub-queries, rewriting each sub-query sep-
arately. For instance, a query dropping a table will be rewrit-
ten to move the table to a safe storage space. This operation
happens without any indication to the attacker. Additionally,
some statements that list tables and databases will be rewrit-
ten to exclude the hidden information from query results.
Controller The Controller component connects all other
DIMAQS system segments. It is the central element that or-
chestrates the processing of incoming queries by other com-
ponents, e.g., through invocation of the Classifier com-
ponent to classify the query as malicious or benign, or the
Incident Resolution component to initiate incident reso-
lution upon attack detection.
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3.4 Component Interaction
Figure 3 depicts the interaction between the components dur-
ing query processing. The database server first receives the
query and then notifies Monitoring (1). If Monitoring
raises an alert for a potentially malicious query type, the
Controller is notified (2). The Controller then forwards
the suspicious query to the Classifier (3) for evaluation.
The Classifier is configured using the security policy from
the Security Policy (4) and returns the classification re-
sult to the Controller (5). There are two possible outcomes:
the query’s classification is either benign or malicious. In
a former case, the Controller terminates its actions, and
the server executes the query as-is (10). In the latter case,
the query is considered malicious, and the Controller
calls Incident Resolution (6), which in turn backs up
dropped tables and rewrites the malicious query using Query
Rewriter (7). It then invokes the Notifier to inform
the administrator about an incident (8). The Controller
then receives the rewritten "disarmed" query from Incident
Resolution (9). The database server then executes the
query (10). The Controller informs Monitoring when ad-
ditional objects need to be observed (11), e.g., when a query
creates new tables.
4 Implementation
DIMAQS design is generic and can be applied to different
database technologies. For the sake of illustration, we have
chosen to prototype it for MySQL servers – our implementa-
tion is realized as MySQL plugin compatible with MySQL
server versions 5.7.x. To function, DIMAQS requires our
own Petri net implementation library libPetri as well as the
mysqlservices library provided by the MySQL server. We
chose the C++11 language for DIMAQS since it is the de-
fault language for MySQL plugins. DIMAQS consists of
4908 lines of code (LoC), while libPetri results in 1008 LoC.
4.1 Plugin Integration
The plugin is loaded during MySQL server start-up and reg-
isters itself as an auditing plugin.
The MySQL server plugin interface provides notifica-
tions [14] for the following useful events:
• MYSQL_AUDIT_CONNECTION_CLASS,
• MYSQL_AUDIT_CONNECTION_CONNECT,
• MYSQL_AUDIT_CONNECTION_DISCONNECT,
• MYSQL_AUDIT_PARSE_CLASS,
• MYSQL_AUDIT_PARSE_POSTPARSE.
Notifications of the MYSQL_AUDIT_PARSE_CLASS class
provide an event of a single to-be-executed query. Queries,
however, could also be nested.
Per default, the MySQL server does not provide any event
that returns the atomic values of database elements affected
by INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE queries. These queries
are typical for the use in attacks like mimicry, e.g., for the
insertion of ransom messages. To allow us to access the
atomic values, we create triggers. We generate “before IN-
SERT/UPDATE” triggers for every table. In these triggers,
we execute a user-defined function. This function forwards
the values affected by the queries to the controller for evalu-
ation.
As detailed in the MySQL trigger syntax [14], a trigger be-
comes associated with a table named tbl_name. This name
must refer to a permanent table, which means that a trigger
does not applay to a temporary table or a view. This limita-
tion does not affect our solution since it is unlikely that an
attacker would attack data stored in temporary tables.
4.2 Component Implementation
In the following, we detail the implementation of DIMAQS
modules.
Monitoring Additional triggers are required to access infor-
mation that is not transparent to the DIMAQS plugin when
using MySQL’s audit features. Trigger creation occurs when
loading the plugin, and existing triggers are recreated af-
ter server startup since the database structure might have
changed. Trigger creation within so-called “stored proce-
dures” or “stored functions,” the conventional concepts sup-
ported by the MySQL server is not possible. Due to this lim-
itation, the creation must be within the plugin code. The
function dimaqs_plugin_init() performs the creation of
the additional triggers and is called directly after initializa-
tion of the server and before entering the listening state.
dimaqs_plugin_init() creates a trigger for every non-
virtual database. Virtual databases are databases that con-
tain read-only views rather than base tables and have no
database files associated with them. Hence, protection of vir-
tual databases is not necessary.
The INSERT and UPDATE triggers call eval_value(). Sev-
eral values are passed to that function, namely (1) schema
name, (2) table name, and (3) new column values. Using this
structure, we can identify inserted/updated values.
Classifier The Classifier is implemented using our library
libPetri. libPetri is a C++ library implementing the func-
tionality of colored Petri nets. It includes dynamic coloring,
token timeout and token merging features mentioned above.
Since libPetri has been developed explicitly for DIMAQS, it
carries no additional feature overhead. Thus, libPetri con-
tains all necessary functionality within around 1008 of LoC.
libPetri keeps track of all active transitions. Since all our
arcs in Classifier are weighted with the value one as seen
in Figure 4, active transitions have tokens on all input places.
If the to-be-classified query matches the action attributed to
an active transition, that transition fires. When transferring
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a token to a place with an associated action, that action ex-
ecutes with the corresponding parameters. Until completion
of these actions, the Classifier does not accept additional
queries.
Security Policy The Security Policy is a database that
contains tables holding the information about the actions that
can fire transitions (e.g., the regular expression for detecting
the ransom message) and the places with their associated ac-
tions. Classifier processes this information on startup and
during classification.
Incident Resolution The Incident Resolution backs
up dropped databases and deleted values. The renaming
of databases is not trivial due to MySQL limitations.
MySQL added a command to carry out a database re-
naming called ’RENAME DATABASE <database_name>.’
However, this command was only active through a
few minor releases before its discontinuation. The
simplest way to rename a database is to move its ta-
bles to another database. Each moved table requires
recreation of the affected triggers. Table renaming fol-
lows the following schema “<storagespace>.<object
prefix>_<dbname>_<tablename>_<timestamp>” with
storagespace being a preconfigured variable of DIMAQS.
The function renameTable() performs this renaming.
If a database drop occurs, renameDatabase() calls the
renameTable() for every table.
For backup actions, a ’DROP DATABASE <db_name>’
does not require rewriting. However, before executing, re-
nameTable or renameDatabase is executed to back up the
database tables.
Notifier The Notifier sends an email with all transmit-
ted information about the suspected attack to the administra-
tor. The administrator’s address can be configured inside the
database or in a configuration file.
Query Rewriter The Query Rewriter rewrites a query by
adding a WHERE/AND condition to hide sensitive informa-
tion or rewrites it entirely, e.g., for backup operations.
Controller The Controller is implemented using the visi-
tor design pattern. This visitor extracts the nested statements
from inside to outside. It then forwards each extracted query
to Classifier.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we describe our test setup and evaluate our im-
plementation with regards to effectiveness and performance.
We conclude by discussing security considerations.
5.1 Test Setup
Testbed To execute performance and security tests, we use
the following setup. For the database server, we use an HPE
ProLiant DL360 Gen9 server [16]. The server is equipped
with a single 8-core Haswell generation Xeon E5-2640 CPU
with a base clock of 2.60 GHz and a turbo clock of 3,40 GHz
and packaged with a total of 20 MB of cache [32]. Simul-
taneous multithreading is enabled allowing the execution of
16 threads in parallel. The server features 32 GB of DDR4
RAM at 2133 MHz with dual channel capability. A 500
GB 3.5-inch hard drive provides storage I/O turning at 7.200
rpm.
For the operating system, we chose Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS
running Linux kernel 4.4.0-121. To provide a DBMS to eval-
uate against we install and run MySQL server 5.7.22 on this
server.
All tests are executed directly on this server. Thus, the
network is not a limiting factor for the benchmarks. Due to
the performance of the server, the resources consumed by
the client running in parallel to the server are expected to be
negligible, and their performance influence is therefore not
evaluated in this work.
Data Sets We employ three data sets during our evalua-
tion. The first set (malicious set) includes malicious query
sequences, which we generated ourselves using information
about real-world attacks collected at [60]. Our resulting
query set contains query sequence permutations with an ex-
pected malicious classification, as well as their possible per-
mutations (since an attacker may execute them in an arbitrary
order). The full test set contains 13 485 tests. Each test con-
tains nine queries. The first five queries of each test are to set
up two databases and a table at the beginning of the experi-
ment and remove them at the end. Relevant to the detection
are four queries: (i) listing all databases, (ii) creating a table,
(iii) inserting a ransom message into this table, and (iv) drop-
ping a table or database. Therefore, the set performs 53 940
queries in total.
The second set (Bibspace set) is from the publication man-
agement system Bibspace [53], which was gathered over 40
days from 13th of April 2018 to 22nd of May 2018 and
contains a total of 52 085 queries. Among them, 24 430
are CREATE_TABLE_IF_NOT_EXISTS queries, 8 357 INSERT
queries, and 38 DROP_TABLE_IF_EXISTS queries.
The third query set (MediaWiki set) is from a locally run
MediaWiki [47] with the Semantic MediaWiki [55] plugin en-
abled, collected for 50 days from 3rd of April 2018 to 22nd of
May 2018. Containing 2 514 764 queries, it includes 69 261
INSERT statements, 29 830 CREATE_TEMPORARY_TABLE
statements, and 29 797 DROP_TEMPORARY_TABLE statements.
We will publish the data sets along with the paper, to allow
third parties to reproduce our tests and to enable follow up
works to compare with our results.
5.2 Effectiveness
In the following, we evaluate the precision of the classifier
module. Thus, we evaluate whether a wrongful classification
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Query set Initial1 Initial2 Initial3 DBListed TabListed ColListed TabCreated Ob jectDeleted Noti f yAdmin
Bibspace 1 1 1 2 2 0 24 0 0
MediaWiki 1 1 1 7 5 1 0 0 0
Table 2: Petri net state after execution of query sets
of benign queries as malicious (false positives) or malicious
query sequences as benign (false negatives) occurs.
Security Policy: The execution policy for the Classifier is
as described in Section 3.3. Our policy is quite generic in the
sense that we do not look for specific table or database names,
but instead detect the removal or renaming of any table or
database. However, we are looking for a specific pattern of
the ransom message. We search for the occurrence of a BTC
or Bitcoin string inside the inserted message since attackers
until now requested ransom in Bitcoins5. We used the regular
expression ’(\d*[.]){0,1}\d+\s*(BTC|Bitcoin)’ (case insensi-
tive). The matching expressions are, e.g., 5 BTC|Bitcoin, .5
BTC|Bitcoin, 20.1 btc|Bitcoin.
False Negatives: To test for false negatives, we used the at-
tack set described in Section 5.1. After processing all the
queries from the data set by our CPN, we achieved 100% at-
tack detection rate and received no false negative result. This
result confirms that our CPN correctly models each attack
from our malicious data set.
False Positives: To test for false positives, we choose to use
the Bibspace set and the MediaWiki set. The sets contain
a total of 2 566 849 benign queries. The Classifier per-
forms classification of every set. Afterward, the Classifier
state shows, if DIMAQS wrongfully detected attacks and
how many false detections occurred. If tokens reach place
N in Classifier, their number represents raised alerts. For
this evaluation, we disable the token timeout, to increase the
potential for false positives.
Table 2 shows the population of the CPN after running all
the queries from the Bibspace set through Classifier. No
token has reached the state N, that would have triggered an
alert to the administrator. Next, the Classifier processed
the queries of the MediaWiki set. Table 2 shows the state
of CPN from Figure 4 after classification. Again, no token
has reached the state N, and no ransom attack was detected,
which is a favorable result.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the DIMAQS plugin, we used
two data sets: The MediaWiki set described in Section 5.1
and the synthetic benchmark sysbench [38]. We use sys-
bench 0.4.12 with 16 active threads. We performed three
performance benchmarks: (1) without the plugin as a base-
line measure, (2) operating on a newly initialized Petri net,
and (3) with a fully occupied Petri net with tokens in each
5Our policy can be trivially extended to detect ransom messages request-
ing payments in other cryptocurrencies.
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Figure 5: Performance influence of DIMAQS for sysbench
and MediaWiki. Values are normalized to the respective
value for the disabled plugin.
Test Transactions relative to
per second baseline [%]
mean stdev conf mean stdev conf
int int
sysbench
disabled 9 245 28 ±9 100.0 0.3 ±0.1
initialized 8 806 30 ±11 95.3 0.3 ±0.1
full 8 823 19 ±7 95.4 0.2 ±0.0
MediaWiki
disabled 2 008 5 ±2 100 0.2 ±0.1
initialize 1 971 7 ±2 98.2 0.3 ±0.1
full 1 930 6 ±13 96.1 2.9 ±0.3
Table 3: Performance without the plugin, with the plugin en-
abled, and with tokens in each Petri net state.
state. Sysbench benchmarks were run for 60 seconds per it-
eration, while theMediaWiki set was classified entirely every
time. We performed every benchmark for over 50 iterations.
Table 3 shows the resulting measurements (database transac-
tions per second). We report average values with standard
deviation and confidence intervals (5% quantile according
to the Student’s t-distribution). Figure 5 visualizes these re-
sults.
The results show that the usage of the DIMAQS plugin re-
sults in performance degradation of about 5 % for sysbench.
There is no substantial differencewhether the Petri net is only
initialized or entirely populated (overlapping confidence in-
tervals). This marginal difference suggests that the overhead
is not a result of querying the Petri net, but from analyzing
and parsing the queries themselves. For the MediaWiki set
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performance degradation is about 2% for the initialized Petri
net and 4% for an entirely populated net. This time, the in-
fluence of the set population has a more significant impact.
Our proof-of-concept prototype is not yet optimized for
performance. Neither DIMAQS nor libPetri has received ex-
tensive profiling for potential bottlenecks. Also, no compiler
optimizations were enabled. Thus, performance improve-
ments are likely possible.
5.4 Security Considerations
In the following, we discuss potential attack scenarios
against DIMAQS itself and show, how our system defends
itself against them.
DIMAQS disabling: An attacker may try to disable DI-
MAQS to avoid detection. However, such a scenario would
not be successful, since administrative privileges to the
database are insufficient to perform this task. One would
need to have administrative privileges to the file system to
manipulate corresponding config files. As an additional bur-
den, it is also non-trivial for an attacker to detect that the
system runs under DIMAQS observation because the Query
Rewriter component of DIMAQS rewrites the queries in
such a way that it excludes information about DIMAQS from
the results.
DIMAQS triggers removal: A next possible attack vector
is specific to MySQL implementation, which uses triggers.
An attacker may attempt to delete triggers, which are used to
deliver additional information to the DIMAQS plugin.
To defend against this attack vector, DIMAQS detects the
removal of DIMAQS-specific triggers. Their absence be-
comes obvious, whenever the plugin does not receive infor-
mation about atomic values affected by the queries. Upon de-
tection, DIMAQS generates a notification for the DIMAQS
administrator and backups all the databases and tables af-
fected by subsequent queries.
6 Related Work
In this section, we provide an overview of the related work in
three domains: (i) intrusion detection for databases, (ii) ran-
somware detection, and (iii) application of Petri Nets for in-
trusion detection in various application domains.
Intrusion Detection for Databases There is a plethora of
previous works on intrusion detection systems in databases,
but none of them explicitly focused on detection of ransom-
ware so far. The first line of works in this category con-
centrate on detection of SQL injections. Fonseca et al. [18]
and Kemalis et al. [34] detect anomalies in SQL commands
given a training set of known valid query structures or their
specifications. Buehrer et al. [21] and Bockermann et al. [4]
use tree structure when parsing SQL statements and then dy-
namically compare them with the intended queries. AMNE-
SIA [22,23] checks the application code for SQL queries gen-
erating automata for each query to match against dynamic re-
quests during operation. SQLCheck [57] validates queries by
adding a key at the beginning and the end of each user’s input
and validate syntactic correctness of the "augmented" queries
at runtime. In contrast to our work, all these approaches con-
centrate on the analysis of single queries, while we aim at
the detection of malicious query sequences.
Intrusion detection frameworks [3,6,58] analyze database
audit logs to detect anomalous queries by matching against
role profiles. In contrast to our work, their analysis con-
centrates on irregular access patterns of single SQL queries.
Moreover, their analysis is bound to user profiles, while DI-
MAQS performs global monitoring across user sessions.
DAIS [42] and the solution by Liu et al. [43] combine
intrusion detection with the dynamic isolation of malicious
and suspicious activities through rewriting of SQL state-
ments. As a result, potentially malicious modifications are
performed on a shadowed incremental copy of the database.
In our work, we use a similar approach to preserve copies of
the values affected by potentially malicious queries.
The most similar work to ours is by Hu et al. [26,27], who
proposed an intrusion detection system for databases using
(uncolored) Petri Nets. However, Hu et al. choose to model
data dependency relationships and regular data update pat-
terns and then detect anomalies, while we model malicious
query sequences and compare the sequences captured at run-
time with the derived model. As such, their system requires
knowledge about the legitimate state of the system, while
our approach represents a signature-based misuse detection
system and needs knowledge about attack patterns. As a re-
sult, our solution applies to databases of arbitrary complexity
and without the need to learn about underlying data structure
(which can be complex), while the solution by Hu et al. re-
quires a training phase to gain knowledge about the database
under protection. On a positive side, their approach is likely
to detect previously unseen malware. The feasibility of the
approach by Hu et al. however was not practically verified,
since authors concentrated on theoretical aspects and did not
provide any implementation and evaluation. Their concept
also relies on several assumptions that simplify the model but
might be too restrictive in practical scenarios. For instance,
they assume low database load and that users only update
the database through a limited number of fixed transactions
modifying the same data items. Our solution, in contrast, op-
erates on databases of arbitrary complexity and with good
performance.
Lee et al. [41] target real-time databases with regular ac-
cess patterns, which occur, e.g., in data collection from sen-
sors. They use time signatures to capture expectations about
update rates and flag unexpected and possibly malicious op-
erations. DIWeBa [52] is an anomaly-based intrusion clas-
sifier for web databases that works at the session level by
fingerprinting user sessions. DIDAFIT [44] models benign
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query sequences and maps them to a directed graph, where
graph vertices represent query signatures. Enforcement of
sequence orders on the graph prevents anomalous queries.
In contrast to our work, solutions above require a training
phase to learn the benign behavior of users, manual setup and
knowledge of the database content, or to construct graphs of
benign queries.
Mathew et al. [46] argue that query classification based on
syntax is more error-prone than observing the accessed data
points since syntactically similar queries can produce signif-
icantly different results. Their system is another example of
observing anomalous database access patterns, which need a
training phase or some predetermined knowledge of accept-
able behavior.
It is also possible to perform intrusion detection through
complex event processing (CEP) [45]. Romano et al. [17]
propose a generic framework for intrusion detection through
CEP, where they examine different intrusions, including pol-
icy violations, buffer overflows and SQL injections. It should
be noted that CEP is not a single algorithmic concept, but
rather the more general idea to infer not directly observable
events frommultiple, related events. In a way, our implemen-
tation with CPNs acts similarly, observing individual queries
that together form a ransomware attack. On the other hand,
CEP systems are mostly merely a monitoring and informa-
tion processing tool, while our solution includes active com-
ponents, such as the automatic table backup functionality.
Commercial solutions, such as IBM Guardium [29] and
IMPERVA SecureSphere [20], offer intrusion detection for
databases for detection of misbehaving users. While detailed
evaluation of these products is impossible due to their propri-
etary nature, we speculate that an attacker could easily evade
their detection, since their analysis is bound to user sessions.
Ransomware Detection Several solutions have been pro-
posed to detect and prevent ransomware at the file level.
CryptoDrop [54], ShieldFS [12, 13] and Redemption [36]
all monitor the file system to detect intrinsic ransomware be-
havior, such as file type changes, file entropy, and file sim-
ilarity. They differ by their choice of observed properties,
and by the mechanisms provided to prevent data loss, such
as providing shadowed copies of files to possibly malicious
processes. UNVEIL [35] tries to detect evasive ransomware
by generating artificial user environments for dynamic anal-
ysis. However, their approach does not apply to server-side
database ransomware. PayBreak [37] observes the use of
symmetric keys commonly used by ransomware to encrypt
files and holds them in escrow. This observation enables the
recovery of the decryption keys upon ransomware detection.
For the observed attacks on databases this approach hardly
applicable since the files were deleted instead of encrypted.
FlashGuard [28] and RWGuard [48] propose ransomware-
tolerant Solid-State Drives (SSDs) which are based on the
property of SSDs to perform out-of-place writes in order to
mitigate long erase latency. Both operate on the firmware
level and are effective in recovering encrypted files without
impacting performance or lifetime.
The related work presented in this section targets client-
side crypto-ransomware and is not applicable for detection
of wipers at databases, as those do not use crypto primitives
and do not access the file system directly.
Petri Nets and State Analysis Previous work has explored
the concept of state analysis and more specifically the use
of Petri nets for intrusion detection. Kumar et al. [39, 40]
present a generic model and a misuse detection system for
OS kernel audit logs using CPNs. This work is conceptu-
ally comparable to our work regarding the use of a Petri net
to match attack patterns but focuses on intrusions in UNIX
systems. Ilgun et al. [31] also focus on UNIX systems and
use states and transitions to identify the necessary steps for
penetrations, resulting in a flexible rule-based system to de-
tect intrusions. Similarly, Shieh et al. [56] propose a pattern-
oriented model with system states and transitions to iden-
tify context-dependent patterns of intrusion. USTAT [30]
is a similar state transition analysis tool for UNIX systems,
which describes penetrations as sequences of state changes
and uses rule-based analysis of audit trails to identify intru-
sions. Ho et al. [25] describe the use of Petri nets for intru-
sion detection through the example of privilege escalation,
again in UNIX systems. Helmer et al. [24] describe a general
approach using Software Fault Trees to create CPNs for intru-
sion detection. The work focuses on modeling of intrusions
and concentrates on the detection of FTP bounce attacks.
Overall, all the works discussed above are intended for
intrusion detection in other environments, mostly in UNIX
systems, and are not explicitly aimed at anomaly detection
in databases or for ransomware detection.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Ransomware attacks are an emerging threat, and their server-
side variance that appeared recently imposes a significant
threat to databases and stored data. In this work, we present
DIMAQS (Dynamic Identification of Malicious Query Se-
quences), the first solution against server-side ransomware.
In its heart, DIMAQS has colored Petri nets (CPN)-based
classifier, which models malicious query sequences and
matches them against query sequences captured at runtime.
We introduce several novel extensions for the CPN, which
allow us to reduce the complexity of the system representa-
tion and achieve better performance.
Our solution is implemented for MySQL servers and real-
ized as a MySQL plugin, which is easily installable on ex-
isting servers. We evaluated our solution with regards to the
precision of the attack detection as well as its performance
and report no false positives, no false negatives and perfor-
mance overhead under 5% for our non-optimized implemen-
tation.
In our future work, we plan to extend DIMAQS for de-
tection of other attack types, since generally the framework
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can be used for detection of arbitrary malicious query se-
quences and thus not necessarily limited to ransomware de-
tection. Moreover, we will investigate possibilities for au-
tomated policy generation, which is potentially achievable
givenmore elaborate malicious data sets and by applying ma-
chine learning techniques. Furthermore, we plan to perform
performance optimization to decrease the imposed overhead
further. Finally, we plan to develop new prototypes that tar-
get other database technologies6.
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